Calendars. 28 Apr 1693. London. The Marquis of Carmarthen (age 34) to the King. Lord Galloway [Galway] will inform you of the conferences which have been had with him about what is thought probable to be attempted at Brest, St. Malo, or Rochefort which are all the places that can be thought of with probability of doing anything upon them; the two latter are to be attempted by land. He will also let you know what his thoughts are about both, and will receive your own orders concerning them, when he has laid down the same observations before you, which he has done to the Queen, and in which I agree with him. As to Brest, which | think the only place where there can be hopes of effecting anything this summer, it is reduced, in my opinion, within a very narrow compass as to what is advisable to be tried there, according to the opinions of the three admirals who are to command the fleet; it is this: that—if a fleet, not under 65 sail of men-of-war, can be got to sea in time, so as to be at Brest before the Brest ships have gone, and before the Toulon squadron joins them—your fleet should attempt to destroy them in Brest Water, notwithstanding the batteries in their passage up to Brest Water, or any preparations of fire ships or other defences which the enemy can have made to oppose them.

But as it will be to no purpose to go into Brest Water if the French fleet has gone out, so also it must by no means be ventured to attack the enemy's whole fleet there, if the Toulon squadron should have come to them, it being the unamimous opinion of the Admiralty that whenever the fleet shall make that attempt in Brest Water, they must either be entire conquerors over all the enemies' ships they find there, or that all the ships which make the attempt must be destroyed, insomuch that they say the undertaking is of no less concern than the whole fleet of England. This is what the said three admirals have only said to me privately, and do not seem willing to speak so freely to the Council, and they did not tell me at the same time that they had reason to believe unless some very positive and particular order is given to the Dutch about this undertaking they would not hazard to make the attempt with them, notwithstanding their general orders to obey the English admirals. I must also inform you, although no doubt Lord Portland has already done so, that when the three admirals had gone from me, Sir Cloudesley Shovell (age 42) returned back and told me that, as he believed the Dutch would not make that attempt with them unless they had positive orders for it, so he was also confident excuses would be made by the English themselves, if it should be left to the discretion of a council of war to attempt it or not as they should think fit. He therefore wished that if they should proceed with the design, the orders to the fleet should be positive to attempt it unless they can give very good reasons why they ought not to putit in execution. If you resolve to attempt anything of this kind at Brest, there will be no use for horse there, nor of more than 5,000 or 6,000 foot, a good number of which the admirals would desire to have on board the men-of-war. They also desire good store of small shot on board when they go into Brest Water, so as to endeavour to take some of the batteries in their passage, if they find it practicable.

In order to this the Queen has already commanded five regiments to be quartered as near Portsmouth as they can conveniently be done, and I wish you would appoint three or four regiments more to be laid so as to be ready for the same use, if it shall be thought convenient, for secrecy is so necessary, and we are in such "reserves" to one another, that we do not speak out enough to be understood amongst ourselves, insomuch that you will be forced to send us your own orders for whatever you think fit to have done of this kind. In short, if anything can be done that is considerable it depends upon expedition and secrecy; and it is so difficult to find either, that I fear our success.

One cause why I find there is not that dispatch made which ought to be, is because some amongst us declare it to be so much in vain to think of attempting anything that they find fault with going about it.

Another thing desired by the Admiralty is that Mons. Meisters may go with them with his machines in case they go to Brest. All his materials are in such readiness that the addition of charge will not be much more than is laid out already.

Whatever your commands shall be, the execution of them will wholly depend upon dispatch, so I hope you will write something to be communicated to the Council to quicken them in making that dispatch, and I hope you will let us know who shall command the land forces to be put on board the ships for the purposes aforesaid, in case you shall give order for no more than will be necessary for the expedition to Brest. [S.P. Dom. King Wiiliam's Chest 14, No. 10.]

Calendars. A descent on France seems to have been a project favoured at Court, and apparently by the Queen. Lord Godolphin was, however, opposed to it on the score of expense. "I confess ingenuously to you"—so he writes to King William on April the 18th—"that I have not faith in the thing itself to give easily in to any expense which the preparations require." Even without that expense the writer saw "all the difficulty imaginable" in meeting the expenses of the Army and Navy without incurring any additional charges (pp. 102-3). However, a week later, he seems to think that a descent, if made on Brest and if made at once, might be worth undertaking (p. 108). Almost at the same time Lord Carmarthen, after being in conference with Lord Galway (who was returning to the King to take his final instructions), writes to his Majesty that the only places m France which seemed practicable for attack were Brest, St. Malo, and Rochefort; the two latter were to be attempted by Jand. Of these places, Carmarthen was also in favour of Brest: "As to Brest, which I think the only place where there can be hopes of effecting anything this summer, it 1s reduced, in my opinion, within a very narrow compass as to what is advisable to be tried there, according to the opinions of the three Admirals who are to command the fleet; it is this: that—ifa fleet, not under sixty-five sail of men-of-war, can be got to sea in time, so as to be at Brest before the Brest. ships have gone, and before the Toulon squadron joms them—your fleet should attempt to destroy them in Brest water, notwithstanding the batteries in their passage up to Brest water, or any preparations of fire ships or other defences which the enemy can have made to oppose them,

"But as it will be to no purpose to go into Brest water if the French fleet has gone out, so also it must by no means be ventured to attack the enemy's whole fleet there, if the Toulon squadron should have come to them, it being the unanimous opinion of the Admiralty that whenever the fleet shall make that attempt in Brest water, they must either be entire conquerors over all the enemy's ships they find there, or that all the ships which make the attempt must be destroyed, insomuch that they say the undertaking is of no less concern than the whole fleet of England. 'This is what the said three admirals have only said to me privately, and do not seem willing to speak so freely to the Council, and they did not tell me at the same time that they had reason to believe, unless some very positive and particular order is given to the Dutch about this undertaking, they would not hazard to make the attempt with them, notwithstanding their general orders to obey the English admirals. —

"IT must also inform you, although no doubt Lord Portland has already done so, that when the three admiral$ had gone from me, Sir Cloudesley Shovell returned back and told me that, as he believed the Dutch would not make that attempt with them unless they had positive orders for it, so he was also confident excuses would be made by the English themselves, if it should be left to the discretion of a Council of War to attempt it or not as they should think fit. He therefore wished that if they should proceed with the design, the orders to the fleet should be positive to attempt it, unless they can give very good reasons why they ought not to put it in execution. If you resolve to attempt anything of this kind at Brest, there will be no use for horse there, nor of more than 5,000 or 6,000 foot, a good number of which the admirals would desire to have on board the men-of-war. They also desire good store of small shot on board when they go into Brest water, so as to endeavour to take some of the batteries in their passage, if they find it practicable.

"Tn order to this the Queen has already commanded five regiments to be quartered as near Portsmouth as they can conveniently be done, and I wish you would appoint three or four regiments more to be laid so as to be ready for the same use, if it shall be thought convenient, for secrecy is so necessary, and we are in such 'reserves' to one another, that we do not speak out enough to be understood amongst ourselves, insomuch that you will be forced to send us your own orders for whatever you think fit to have done of this kind. In short, if anything can be done that is considerable it depends upon expedition and secrecy; and it is so difficult to find either, that I fear our success.