Books, Calendars, Calendar of the State Papers of William and Mary 1693 Preface

Calendar of the State Papers of William and Mary 1693 Preface is in Calendar of the State Papers of William and Mary 1693.

The year 1693 was indeed unfortunate for this country; disasters befel its forces by land and sea. The old adage that success never attends a journey renewed after being once begun and abandoned, certainly proved true in the case of King William: he went to Harwich, en route for the continent, on the 25th of March (p. 84), but finding the wind unfavourable for his passage to Holland, returned to Kensington, setting out again six days later. Writing on the 1st of April, Lord Nottmgham tells Lord Sydney that the King had embarked at Gravesend on the previous night (p. 89).

As in previous years the letters in "King William's Chest" contain very minute descriptions of passing events on the continent:—the movements of troops, the policies of the various Allies, disagreements amongst their leaders, intercepted letters revealing the intentions of the French, (as on p. 228), and so forth; and, as in previous years, these letters have been calendered quite shortly because they will be, hereafter, fully dealt with in the calendar of State Papers Foreign.

Concerning the disastrous defeat of the Allies at Landen, there is perhaps naturally little, for King William was himself present at that battle, and the information as to other encounters is chiefly contained in letters written to the King by the different commanders. 'There is, however, the wellknown intercepted letter from the Prince de Conti to the Princess—in which the writer pays a graceful tribute to the personal bravery of King William and the valour of the English troops—and this will be found on pp. 201-202. A torn news-letter, written from London on 1st August, and addressed to the Earl of Derwentwater at Newcastle-on-Tyne, refers to the battle, and records the fact that the Duke of Berwick had been made prisoner (p. 246).

The obstinate resistance of Charleroi is very fully illustrated. Under date — August, the Duke of Holstem writes from Ninove that Charleroi had 'commenced to surrender" (p. 247); but bis statement was certainly premature, and a few days later he corrects it, adding that the town still held out with vigour, but that it was impossible to help it, as no troops could be spared from Liege (p. 255). Further accounts follow under the dates 26th and 29th September (pp. 341 and 347), and on October the 1st the Duke writes to the King that Lord Galway will tell him how much the Elector of Bavaria, who had himself written to King William, pressed for the relief of Charleroi, which however the Duke did not think could hold out long enough to allow of anything being undertaken (p. 350). A letter on the same day and from the same writer states that he believes that the place had actually surrendered on the previous day (77d).

The evidently strong appeal of the Elector bore fruit, for on the 3rd of October is a declaration by King William, who was at Loo, entirely in his own handwriting, that he had resolved to succour Charleroi (pp. 352-3); and two days later is an order from the King, also in his own hand, to the Dutch troops at Liege to march to the aid of the place (p. 354). A letter, dated from Ninove the same day, announces the Duke of Holstein's determination to attempt the relief (27d).

On October 6, the Elector of Bavaria writes that the place still holds out (p. 355). On the 13th the same writer and the Duke of Holstein both announce the surrender, and on the 19th the latter gives it as his opinion that the French will not undertake anything further that Autumn (p. 370).

Except for the gossip in the news-letters, we do not hear much as to the campaign in Catalonia; there is, however, an unaddressed letter from the Marquis de Gregny, dated 1st August, in which the writer expresses the opinion that had the French followed up their success, the loss of Rosas might have been very serious in its effect on the Allies; even as it was he urged that unless further help reached him with speed the whole of Catalonia would be lost (p.244). The campaign in Piedmont and the battle of Marsaglia receive even less notice; indeed, except in the news-letters, the famous French victory is not named.

At sea the Allies met with misfortunes which were even more keenly felt in England. We hear of French naval preparations for the year as early as February. Fifteen or sixteen ships of from 50 to 70 guns were then ready to sail from Brest for the West Indies to relieve those vessels then stationed there. Three new "three-deck" ships had been built at Brest and others at Rochefort, Havre and Bion, but it was considered that the French fleet would "scarce be fitted out to come to sea this summer" (p. 32), Whether or not the statement as to the want of preparedness was purposely made to deceive, we do not know, but certain it is that when it came to a trial of strength, the French were conspicuously successful. 'The story of our ill-luck at sea during the year 1693 is so well known that it hardly needs re-telling, so we pass to consider some of the more important documents which bear upon it.

On February the 28th the merchants trading to Bilbao and St. Sebastian petitioned the King for a convoy for the Turkey and Virginian fleets, and their petition was referred to the Admiralty (p. 52). On March 29th ten ships were ordered to proceed with the merchantmen thirty leagues beyond Sicily; Sir George Rooke thereupon ordered six English and four Dutch ships to perform that service, but the Dutch ViceAdmiral raised objections (pp. 85 and 87).

A descent on France seems to have been a project favoured at Court, and apparently by the Queen. Lord Godolphin was, however, opposed to it on the score of expense. "I confess ingenuously to you"—so he writes to King William on April the 18th—"that I have not faith in the thing itself to give easily in to any expense which the preparations require." Even without that expense the writer saw "all the difficulty imaginable" in meeting the expenses of the Army and Navy without incurring any additional charges (pp. 102-3). However, a week later, he seems to think that a descent, if made on Brest and if made at once, might be worth undertaking (p. 108). Almost at the same time Lord Carmarthen, after being in conference with Lord Galway (who was returning to the King to take his final instructions), writes to his Majesty that the only places m France which seemed practicable for attack were Brest, St. Malo, and Rochefort; the two latter were to be attempted by Jand. Of these places, Carmarthen was also in favour of Brest: "As to Brest, which I think the only place where there can be hopes of effecting anything this summer, it 1s reduced, in my opinion, within a very narrow compass as to what is advisable to be tried there, according to the opinions of the three Admirals who are to command the fleet; it is this: that—ifa fleet, not under sixty-five sail of men-of-war, can be got to sea in time, so as to be at Brest before the Brest. ships have gone, and before the Toulon squadron joms them—your fleet should attempt to destroy them in Brest water, notwithstanding the batteries in their passage up to Brest water, or any preparations of fire ships or other defences which the enemy can have made to oppose them,

"But as it will be to no purpose to go into Brest water if the French fleet has gone out, so also it must by no means be ventured to attack the enemy's whole fleet there, if the Toulon squadron should have come to them, it being the unanimous opinion of the Admiralty that whenever the fleet shall make that attempt in Brest water, they must either be entire conquerors over all the enemy's ships they find there, or that all the ships which make the attempt must be destroyed, insomuch that they say the undertaking is of no less concern than the whole fleet of England. 'This is what the said three admirals have only said to me privately, and do not seem willing to speak so freely to the Council, and they did not tell me at the same time that they had reason to believe, unless some very positive and particular order is given to the Dutch about this undertaking, they would not hazard to make the attempt with them, notwithstanding their general orders to obey the English admirals. —

"IT must also inform you, although no doubt Lord Portland has already done so, that when the three admiral$ had gone from me, Sir Cloudesley Shovell returned back and told me that, as he believed the Dutch would not make that attempt with them unless they had positive orders for it, so he was also confident excuses would be made by the English themselves, if it should be left to the discretion of a Council of War to attempt it or not as they should think fit. He therefore wished that if they should proceed with the design, the orders to the fleet should be positive to attempt it, unless they can give very good reasons why they ought not to put it in execution. If you resolve to attempt anything of this kind at Brest, there will be no use for horse there, nor of more than 5,000 or 6,000 foot, a good number of which the admirals would desire to have on board the men-of-war. They also desire good store of small shot on board when they go into Brest water, so as to endeavour to take some of the batteries in their passage, if they find it practicable.

"Tn order to this the Queen has already commanded five regiments to be quartered as near Portsmouth as they can conveniently be done, and I wish you would appoint three or four regiments more to be laid so as to be ready for the same use, if it shall be thought convenient, for secrecy is so necessary, and we are in such 'reserves' to one another, that we do not speak out enough to be understood amongst ourselves, insomuch that you will be forced to send us your own orders for whatever you think fit to have done of this kind. In short, if anything can be done that is considerable it depends upon expedition and secrecy; and it is so difficult to find either, that I fear our success.

"One cause why I think there is not that dispatch made which ought to be, is because some amongst us declare it to be so much in vain to think of attempting anything that they find fault with going about it. Another thing desired by the Admiralty is that Mons. Meisters may go with them with his machines in case they go to Brest.... Whatever your commands may be, the execution of them will wholly depend upon dispatch" (pp. 111-112).

King William seems to have agreed to the undertaking, subject to the approval of the admirals, and we find, under date 3rd May, a direction from Sir John Trenchard to the admirals to call a council of flag officers to consider the advisability of sailing forthwith to Brest, and, when off that place, another council at which it was to be resolved how far such an attempt was practicable. No time was to be lost and troops were ready to embark under the admirals' orders (pp. 118-112).

On the 13th of May instructions were given to Lord Carmarthen, the Earls of Devonshire, Dorset and Rochester, and Sir John Trenchard to repair to the fleet with the Queen's orders to the admirals to obey the instructions of the visitors; to call a council of war to consult as to the best means of annoying the enemy; and to give orders for the sailing of the fleet towards Brest; and to the commander of the Mediter-— ranean squadron as to convoy (p. 134). At the same time orders were sent to the English and Dutch admirals and to Rooke to obey orders given to them by the visitors (b7d).

The visitors reached the fleet at St. Helen's without delay, and the following day a Council was held on board the Britannia. The minutes of this Council are preserved and will be read with interest (pp. 185-137), as will those of a further meeting held the following day (pp. 138-139).

On 19th May Trenchard directed the Admiralty to issue orders for the sailing of the Mediterranean squadron and the ships under their convoy as soon as possible. The main fleet was to sail with them as far as should be thought requisite, and, on parting, the admirals were to direct the said squadron to shape such a course for Cadiz as should be determined upon by a council of war. The admirals were to send notice to the West India convoy, then at Plymouth, to be ready to proceed with the other ships when the fleet should arrive off Plymouth (p. 143).

On the 24th the admirals wrote that they would have sailed that day had they not been becalmed (p. 151). No start had been made on the 29th, and Trenchard wrote to the admirals that the Queen—-evidently annoyed at the delay—desired to know what had caused it; she also desired to know the reason of "this delay from day to day" (p. 158). The admirals replied next day that they were under sail and that no time had been lost either by themselves or by Rooke (p. 159). In another letter of the same date they wrote to Trenchard:—

"The wind being N.E. by E., we are under sail with the fleet, and hope Sir George Rooke with his squadron and all the merchant-men will get out with us this day. We have sent a ship to give notice to those at Plymouth to be in readiness to join us when we appear off that port. When anything worthy of notice occurs we shall acquaint you with it, and if there is any knowledge of the enemy's fleet, we do not doubt but that you will let us know. We have left the necessary orders for such ships as are not in readiness to sail with us, and think all will get clear of this place in two or three days, if the want of provisions, especially beer and bread, does not hinder them; and we hope such effectual care will be taken that the fleet may be speedily supplied with beer and anything else soonest wanted" (p. 160).

On or before May the 31st, news of some kind reached London from Scilly, as did a list of the French ships from France, and explicit orders thereon were given to Rooke and sent in duplicate to Portsmouth and Plymouth with directions that they were to be forwarded immediately to the fleet. The orders to Rooke ran as follows:-—

"If you have certain intelligence before you part from the main fleet that the French Toulon squadron has joined the rest of their fleet, you shall leave the Monk, Lyon, Woolwich, Lumley Castle, Princess Anne, Loyal Merchant, Lark, Salamander (bomb vessel), the Oosterstellingwerf, the Beschermer, Medemblick, Nimeger, and one fire-ship, also the Turkish Tiger and the Smyrna Factor to convoy the ships bound to the Mediterranean, under the command of such person as shall be appointed by the Lords of the Admiralty; and with the residue of the ships under your command you shall remain with the main fleet till further order. In case you hear at Cadiz that the said Toulon squadron is come into the ocean, you shall leave the Mediterranean ships to proceed with the abovesaid men-of-war, and return to join the main fleet as soon as may be; and in order thereunto make for the port of Plymouth, where you will receive further orders" (p. 163).

These orders should be compared with those issued to the admirals evidently before, but to which no day of the month is given; these are calendared on p. 164.

Further orders to Rooke were sent on the 6th of June, under cover to the consul at the Groyne, authorizing him to regulate the length of his stay with the merchant ships at Cadiz as he should judge "best for the service" (p. 170).

Very full information, and apparently of a reliable nature, as to the movements of the French fleet, reached the Government on or before June 14th, and was on that day communicated, by the Queen's orders, to the admirals, who were directed to call, on its receipt, a Council of flag officers to review the situation (pp. 180-1).

But a week later more detailed and more definite and alarming news of the French fleet reached Whitehall, and was sent by Trenchard to the admirals. Upon consideration of the news, the Lords of the Council as well as the merchants were very apprehensive that the design of the French may be to intercept the Mediterranean squadron in their passage to Cadiz, and to join the Count D'Estrée." The news was that the French fleet had gone to Cadiz and that it had, by the time of writing, probably arrived there. Rich captures were anticipated, as the visit was not expected. The junction with Mons. D'Kstrée was to be off the Spanish coast, and the joint fleet was to proceed to Cadiz. Later news was to the effect that Marshal de Tourville was unable to keep his intended attack on Cadiz a complete secret, and that the merchant ships there, learning of his approach, made ready for sea; but they could not well have escaped seeing that de Tourville would come upon them one way, and Count D'Hstrée the other.

Certainly this information was sufficiently disquieting, but it was hoped that it might reach Rooke in time to avert disaster. "It being reasonably to be presumed"—so ran Trenchard's letter to the admirals— "that if Sir George Rooke have timely advice of this design he will think it advisable to return to England or Ireland, or, if his squadron should unfortunately fall in with the French fleet, the merchantmen will endeavour to made their escape the same way." The Queen, therefore, commands that you take such course... best for securing the retreat of any ships belonging to that squadron ... and annoying the enemy on their return home, without limit as to distance from England."

The disastrous effect on the prestige of the country and on its commerce, should the threatened misfortune have occurred, was fully realized by the Queen and her advisers, and the instructions conclude: "It is of the greatest importance, if such a misfortune should have happened as that the Turkey convoy should have fallen into the enemy's hands, that no care or industry on your part should be omitted to meet the French fleet, and endeavour to repair that loss" (pp. 187-188).

On the 28th, conditional orders were sent to Rooke himself that, if on reaching Portugal he found that the Toulon squadron had joined the rest of the French fleet, he was to leave certain vessels of his squadron to act as convoy to the ships bound for the Mediterranean, and return to jom our main fleet making for Plymouth (p. 199),

It is not clear at what date news of the disaster which befel Rooke reached England, but it would seem that it had done so several days before June 29, when Sir R. Delaval writes to a friend, in answer to a letter which had evidently conveyed intelligence, that there was a popular outcry against the admirals, who were blamed for the disaster. "I have," he writes, "the misfortune to be of some people's faction." As for the fault alleged against them, he writes that the sailing of the Straits fleet before certain intelligence had been obtained of the enemy was directly against the opinion of all the flag officers. The lack of provisions had hindered our fleet from getting under way. As for their "leaving" Rooke, it was done with the approbation of a Council of war, "the Dutch showing a particular aversion to going above ten leagues to the westward of Ushant, but we prevailed with them to go thirty." They then held another Council to propound going with Rooke another fifty leagues, "or till we could hear of the French fleet, in which proposal all the Dutch and some of the English differed so far from me that I declared I saw no prospect of doing any such good service this summer as proceeding with and securing the Straits fleet." Shovell and Killigrew agreed with him, but all they "could bring the Dutch to was to sail with them 20 leagues further and before we had well done so they were quite out of sight. yet I am maliciously blamed for my actions," Delaval complained of lack of provisions and of lack of ships. "Had we," he concludes, "received orders to go with Mr. Rooke to Lisbon we should have run the hazard of starving the fleet." A fall had disabled the writer's arm, and he asks that "a place" may be provided for him in Chelsea "College" (pp. 201202).

The best chance of wiping out the moral effects of our misfortunes was to intercept the French fleet on its return to France, and on the 3rd of July, Trenchard wrote to the admirals: "The Queen is of opinion (considering the time that the French fleet has been upon the coast of Portugal and Spain) that it is probable they will be upon their return home before our fleet [7.¢. Rooke's squadron] can reach Lisbon." A demonstration along the shores of England by the returning victors would then be quite possible, and Trenchard's letter continues that, under such circumstances it would be "by no means conyenient" for the main fleet to be very far from England. The Queen would, therefore, give no "positive" but left it to the admirals to govern themselves according to the intelligence they received at sea. Provisions order, would be sent them without delay and then they were to sail to any place where they would be most likely to "meet and intercept the enemy" on their return before getting into any of their ports. "This," continued the letter, "you are to do as soon as possibly may be, without expecting further orders".

We do not get the admirals' reply, but on July the 7th Trenchard writes that the Queen approved of the postponement of the Council of war till the actual day of sailing, but they were to send fast vessels towards Cape Clear and the Coast of Portugal to gain intelligence either of the Mediterranean squadron or of the enemy. 'The King considered that Lord Berkeley should command as admiral of the blue, Captain Aylmer as vice-admiral of the red, and Captain Mitchell as vice-admiral of the blue (p. 216). More direct orders to the admirals to sail were conveyed in Trenchard's letters of the 11th of July: "The Queen commands that you go to sea with the fleet as soon as weather will permit, and that if the wind be not fair you endeavour to tide it out of the Yhannel"; it being probable that the enemy's returning fleet would very shortly be reaching the French coast. The victualling ships were to follow the fleet (p. 220). Again on the 14th, Trenchard writes to the admirals, enclosing advices which had been received by the Queen, who thought it "of the last consequence". that the admirals should obey the orders already sent them and get out of the Channel to intercept the French fleet. A very careful system of scouting with the smaller ships is enjoined (p. 229).

News from Rooke that the French fleet was at Lagos Bay reached our fleet on or before July 15 (p. 226), and the following day Trenchard again directs the admirals to sail (in accordance with the opinion of a Council of war that had been held) without waiting for the arrival of Sir George Rooke and his squadron, which was expected from Kinsale

We do not get from the documents here calendared the exact date of sailing of the fleet, but it was forty leagues S.W. of Ushant on July the 23rd. On the 22nd Trenchard had told the admirals the Queen left them at liberty to go and fight the French as far from the English coast as should be decided on by a Council of war, and that she expected them to take all necessary measures to engage the enemy before they returned to their own ports. Great care was to be taken of the provisions on board the ships, as it was uncertain how long the fleet might have to remain at sea.

On the 23rd of July the admirals, assembled at a Council of war on board the Britannia forty leagues $.W. of Ushant, acknowledged Trenchard's letter of the 16th, informed him of the action taken thereon, and decided that their present rendezvous was the "properest" till further information of the enemy was obtained, and till the victuallers came to the fleet.

On the 1st August, Trenchard expressed to Rooke, who had reached Kinsale, the Queen's pleasure that he, with certain ships of his squadron, should join the main fleet and take upon him the command of the blue squadron, "as admiral thereof" (p. 243). At the,same time he was directed to send two ships to Gibraltar to convoy four ships of the Turkey Company on their eastern voyage and see them safely back to England (ibid). Rooke had sailed before these instructions arrived and they were carried out by Captain Fairborne, who, in Rooke's absence, was left in command (p. 254).

On the 9th of August order was given to Rooke to remain at Cork or Kinsale, and cancelling the directions for him to join the main fleet and send the two frigates to Gibraltar (p. 257). The reason for this change was the receipt of advices about the French fleet received from Spain by way of Holland and forwarded to the admirals. The covering letter to the adinirals states that it is probable the order to Rooke would not reach him in time for him to obey it, and so (apparently presuming that Rooke and his squadron had joined the main fleet) the admirals were directed to send certain ships to Plymouth and others to join a Dutch squadron to go to the Sound. If, however, they had reliable intelligence that the Brest and Toulon squadrons were coming "into these seas" no separation of the fleet was to take place. If on the other hand no such intelligence was received, then, after a Council of war, an attempt was to be made upon the coast of France, "it being of great importance that some considerable service should be done by the fleet before you return into port" (p. 257). Perhaps this last passage was penned under the inspiration of a letter received from the Hague which ran: "Most of the ministers of the allies in the congress (though they do not pretend to give advice what our fleet should do) yet say that they hope we shall at least land some men to do mischief on the French coast.... But if so brave a fleet as ours comes home again without doing anything at all it will be a great disheartening to our friends" (pp. 257-208).

But when this letter was written the fleet was already on its return to Torbay (in accordance with a resolve come to at a Council of war held on the 6th of August), so that the seamen might "suffer the want of necessaries no longer" (p. 267). The ships reached Torbay on the morning of the 16th of August, and in the afternoon Sir George Rooke and his squadron arrived. 'The ships, so say the admirals, would be provisioned as soon as possible, and they add that they will be glad to have it in their power "to attempt anything advisable with the fleet that may be for the satisfaction of their Majesties and their allies" (p. 271).

The same day Rooke announced his arrival in a letter to Trenchard. "I cannot," he writes, "with gratitude and duty enough acknowledge the Queen's justice and goodness in preferring me to my proper post after my late unhappy success, in which, though I was unfortunate, Ido not doubt to justify myself to the world that I was not faulty." "The admirals do not seem to have appreciated the Queen's consideration for Rooke in placing him in command of the blue squadron, and the writer concludes his letter by presuming they will "give their reasons for this reluctance" (p. 271).

Orders to the admirals were directed immediately on the receipt of the news that the fleet had reached Torbay, and in these orders, strict injunctions are again given that, should news arrive that:the French fleet was returning to Brest, they were to put to sea and endeavour to intercept it (p. 273).

Hope of any effort on the part of the fleet to redeem the character of masterly mactivity, which it is clear had been bestowed upon it, must have been dashed by the receipt of a decision come to by the admirals on August the 19th. It was then decided that as there was no certain intelligence that the Brest and Toulon fleets had joined and were coming into "these seas," the Council was of opinion that "the year being so far spent, and the land forces in the fleet very few and sickly, it is advisable not to attempt anything on the coast of France, for that the damage that may be done to the enemy is not equivalent to the hazard the fleet will run" (p. 276). After this the fleet was ordered to St. Helen's, where it arrived on August the 29th (p. 291). Ata Council of war held. on the Britannia at St. Helen's on the 16th of September, it was agreed that the various resolutions passed were "made according to the best of our reason and executed to the best of our knowledge, and we heartily wish the event had answered our intentions and endeavours" (p. 328).

The position of Rooke and his relation with the admirals of the main fleet receives further. illustration in a letter written by Sir George to Trenchard on August the 23rd.

News had reached him that "suggestions" to his prejudice had been made to some of the Queen's ministers by the joint admirals, and he therefore sent to Trenchard a narrative of his proceedings on his "late unhappy voyage," which narrative he desired might be published both for his own justification and the satisfaction of others (p. 288). The narrative is not with the letter, but Rooke's protest to the admirals and their reply are preserved. In the former he sent them Trenchard's letter signifying the Queen's pleasure that he should, on joming the fleet, be put in command of the blue squadron, and he desired to be placed without further delay in the position.. He added: 'The character I have had the honour to serve under these four years past in the navy renders it a very great hardship and indignity to remain so long here in a private capacity" (p. 283). The admirals replied that they had no orders to give him the command, but merely "a letter of information from the Admiralty .... When we have a proper order you need not doubt we shall do accordingly" (Ibid). Rooke's comment on the answer is that it is the first time he had observed the Queen's pleasure, attested by a secretary of State, not allowed as equivalent to an order.

It is somewhat difficult from the documents here calendared to say how far the admirals were responsible for the inactivity of our fleet, and for the calamity which befel the merchant ships and their convoy under Rooke; but enough appears to reveal the fact that jealousies and differences existed between the English and Dutch admirals, and even between the English admirals themselves. It is also abundantly clear that at least some of the delay in getting the fleet ready for sea was due to the backwardness of the victualling arrangements, which backwardness was itself due to the impoverished state of the Exchequer, and to the contradictory orders, prompted no doubt by a view to economy, which were from time to time issued. In August the Victualling office was £100,000 in debt (p. 287), and in the same month Sir Edward Gregory writes from Chatham that the timber merchants would not contract for another "stick" till they saw what Parliament was going to do as to voting money for their payment; "the most substantial. dealers," he adds, "tell me that the late assignment of their bills upon funds so terribly remote puts the very best of them in extreme difficulties." One of them was then taking "sanctuary in his own house, not daring to show his head abroad".

But rightly or wrongly, blame fell upon the admirals, and knowledge of public hostility certainly reached the fleet. On September the 14th the admirals ask permission to come to town (p. 328). A request, probably granted, for what seems to be a postponement of the permission occurs on the 23rd (p. 337). On the 29th all, including Rooke and Almonde, are directed to come to London and to visit Trenchard at his office, as the Queen had given him in command "something" to say to them (p. 345). What that "something" was we do not learn, but a week later the Queen directed the preparation of a Commission for the Earl of Danby to be rear-admiral of the blue, and gave orders for vacating the commands of Sir Cloudesley Shovell and Lord Berkeley as admirals. "Their pretensions" were to be reserved for the King's return (p. 355). More than a month after this Trenchard wrote to Killigrew and Sir Ralph Delaval that it was the King's pleasure that they should forbear to come to the Admiralty Board, or to act as commissioners of the Admiralty till further order (p. 395). This was evidently a temporary suspension pending enquiry.

A news-letter, dated November the 30th, tells us that Yesterday, the House of Commons had, by a majority of nine, decided against Captain Kerr's declaration that "the Admiral" knew that the French fleet was putting to sea on the llth of May (p. 412). The admirals were ordered to again attend the House, and we learn by a later news-letter, dated on the 17th of December, that, "last Sunday," the King, "to show his resentment and dissatisfaction at the conduct of the three: commanding admirals last summer," declared them discharged from all military and civil employment (p. 426). The three admirals here named were Killigrew, Delaval and Shovell, but it was the general opinion that the last named would be employed again at sea (¢bid). Later on, Trenchard directs that the admirals be left out of the commission of oyer and terminer then passing for the Admiralty (p. 434).

There is one document, and only one, in the papers here calendared which can be said to have any bearing on the alleged want of attachment to King Willam on the part of the admirals. This letter, or rather copy of a letter, will be found under date 12th July, and whether or not it was a genuine invitation to the person addressed (Admiral Killigrew) or a mere concoction 'to implicate him in a plot, it is impossible to say. 'The letter dwells on "the tottering and miserable condition" of the nation and pleads that the moment was most favourable for going over with the fleet to King James: "You have now," says the writer, "the finest opportunity in the world, upon the loss of the Straits fleet, by telling the seamen they are betrayed" (p. 224).

It is but natural that the English merchants were pressing that a strong convoy should accompany the Straits fleet sent out in the autumn, and after the impressive object-lesson which it had received, it is also natural to find the Government taking vigorous measures to avert another disaster. Sir Francis Wheler had returned from a West Indian voyage, and before the end of September we hear it suggested that he should command the squadron to be sent to the Mediterranean as a convoy for the eastern-bound merchant ships, and, in conjunction with the Duke of Savoy, in some way annoy the enemy (p. 344).

Wheler's instructions, given to him in November, were very specific. On 'reaching Malta he was to dispatch ships to convoy the merchantmen to Scanderoon and Smyrna; those convoying to the latter place were to see the vessels in their charge "safe within the castles of the Dardenelles": and to bring them back to Smyrna. No attempt was to be made by the commander of the convoy to block up the Grand Seignior's ports, which were to be left "free and open as well for enemies' as friends' ships." Having sent away the Turkish convoys, Wheler was to return to the Mediterranean, and then do any possible service against the enemy. Whilst there, he was to send three men of war "to appear before Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli" and to deliver the present prepared for the government of Tunis. A demonstration against that of Tripoli was to be made if needful. Our ships were to take in all necessary stores and provisions at Carthagena and other Spanish ports, the King of Spain having given directions that necessaries were to be taken on board "customs free" (pp. 401-404). Additional instructions were sent to Wheler two days later: on joming the Spanish "armada" he was to act "as most advisable for annoying the enemy," giving the Duke of Savoy notice of his arrival in the Mediterranean, and, should the Duke desire his co-operation, he was to use his "best endeavours to bring the same to a happy issue" (p. 405). At the same time, or two days later, Lord Galway was sent as ambassador to Savoy (p. 407). Wheler sailed from Spithead on the 27th of December (p. 438)."

An incidental remark of this very capable commander, in regard to one of those going with him, is worthy of quotation:

"If," says Wheler, "he intends to make the sea his business, I shall now and then put him in mind to apply himself to the mechanical part of a seaman, for nobody can make a good officer without it" (p. 421).

Probably to appease the noisy clamour of the people at the disasters which had befallen our forces by land and sea, the idea of a naval demonstration against France, which, as we have seen, was seriously considered in the spring, was revived in the autumn, and the very day the main fleet returmed to St. Helen's we find an order issued for carrying out the project: "There being occasion to employ some men of war on a particular service," wrote Trenchard to the Admiralty, the Queen commanded the preparation of six fourth-rates, four fifth-rates, two fire-ships, four brigantines, six bomb vessels, forty shallops, and three of the best sailing tenders to be manned with chosen men from the fleet and specially provisioned; the overlooking of the preparations was entrusted to Captam Benbow, and he, in conjunction with Captain Phillips, were ultimately placed in command of the expedition (p. 291).

From this time until late in the autumn, some mention of the progress of the new "project" is found on almost every page of the Calendar. Definite instructions to the commanders occur on September the 18th: They were to. sail with the first fair wind direct to St. Malo; to provide themselves, before departure, with able pilots; but the governors of Jersey and Guernsey were directed to supply these if asked so todo. On reaching St. Malo, Benbow and Phillips were éo use their utmost endeavour to destroy the place "by bombarding or setting it on fire," and they were "to burn, destroy or take" such ships as they should find in the harbour. If, after this service, they had sufficient ammunition and stores, they were at liberty to attack any port or place, eastward of St. Malo, which seemed to them practicable. Having carried out these instructions, they were to return direct to England and give account of their proceedings (pp. 328 and 329). It was desired that the vessels for this expedition should be ready to start by the 1st of October (p. 335).

Captain Thomas Phillips writes that he had made several trials of the two bomb-vessels and found no manner of complaint with the vessels, mortars, or carriages. "Our shooting," he says, "is much straighter than in mortars from the shore, and our lengths with the same quantity of powder beyond expectation" (p. 339).

It was expected that the ships would return in a month from the time of starting (p. 340).

On September the 29th, Phillips writes from the Nore, apparently ready to sail: he desires that positive orders might be sent to Spithead that the vessels should be ready on his arrival, "otherwise we may be delayed as we have been here." Captain Benbow had then "gone that way" (p. 346).

But delay occurred despite efforts to prevent it. The Queen directed that no seaman should go ashore at Spithead "without very good cause" till the squadron was manned, and if there were not sufficient men at Spithead, others were to be sent with all haste (p. 348). On the 4th of October the Queen directed that the expedition be ready to sail on the 10th "at the furthest" and that account be given to her in writing of any "obstruction or delay" (p. 354); but further indications of delay are the only other illustrations which the Calendar gives of the expedition to St. Malo. A news-letter, which gives information sent from Falmouth on November the 6th, states that the expedition did not leave Jersey "before last Sunday" (p. 396). Under date November 22nd is an order for calling home Phillips and Benbow (p. 406); and news from Deal, dated the 30th, tells us that "the great church of St. Malo with several fine houses are destroyed by our bombs" (p. 420).

Presumably some French vessels were taken, as reference occurs, under date December the 11th, to sixty-two French prisoners sent on shore from Benbow's squadron (p. 424).

Documents belonging to the autumn and winter of 1693 reveal a distinct desire on the part of the Government to put the fleet in such a position that it might, on the first opportunity, efface the ill-effects of the disasters of the year. Vast sums for the proper equipment of the navy were requisitioned in the City, and the opulent merchants (to whom had been brought home in the most forcible manner the importance of the fleet as a safeguard to British commerce), were not slow to lend what was required. The Admiralty of the day seemed inclined to acknowledge the country's indebtedness to the City; with the display of much common sense, and realizing how valuable is the advice of level-headed business men in State affairs, it actually contemplated the appointment of a Committee of Trade, to be composed of merchants who were to sit in the City and transmit information to the Admiralty. It was even said that citizens would be added to the Lords of the Admiralty (p. 426).

On the last day of the year a vigorously worded order was issued by the Admiralty against sailors absenting themselves during the "press;" and civil officers who refused assistance to the press-gang would have to answer for their rashness. Surgeons and gunners, as well as ordinary seamen, were liable to severe punishment for keeping out of the way (p. 440).

The documents relating to Scotland do not call for particular attention, Passing events in that kingdom find occasional mention in the news-letters, but the official documents are meagre and unimportant.

Under date 28th February a writ was issued for a substantial gift to the four Scotch Universities: Out of the revenues in the Crown's hands by the abolition of episcopacy, £1,200 was to be yearly bestowed upon these institutions in order that there might be maintained in each one professor and ten bursars of divinity; the former to be nominated by 'the Crown or by the Treasury of Scotland, and the latter to be students "of good report for their learning, sober and pious conversation," who had there graduated masters of Arts. As bursars they were to study divinity under the professors for two years, and then, for one year, to go abroad and reside in some protestant university, "whereby they may be disponed and qualified to be ministers of the gospel after their return" (p. 49).

Ireland again occupies a very large share of attention in the Calendar. At the outset we find Lord Sydney expecting his recall (p. 6) and on the 5th of May he refers, in writing to Lord Nottingham, to the rumour which had reached him that he was to be succeeded by Lords Justices; of this plan he expresses. his approval (p. 121). Yet Lord Nottingham writes to him on the 13th of May that he did not know "till lately" of the King's intention to recall him, nor who were to be his successors till a few days ago (p. 134). The new Lords Justices were Lord Capell, Sir Cyril Wyche and Mr. Duncombe (bid). On the 24th June Lord Sydney writes: "I embark next week" (p. 192). The Lords Justices entered on their duties on the 28th July (p. 238).

The proceedings of the Irish Parliament: caused both Lord Sydney and the government at home considerable anxiety. Writing on January the 29th, the Lord Lieutenant says: "It is time to decide whether or not the parliament should sit again on the date to which it had been adjourned, the 6th of April." "I dare not," he adds, "advise either way," though he was clearly in favour of "trying them once more" as he thinks they will behave better in regard to providing money than they have behaved in the past; they had, as he significantly put it, tasted the ills of an unpaid army (p. 22). The subject of the continued prorogation finds frequent mention, and the parliament had not met when the Calendar closes at the end of 1693. On the 27th of June, Sydney acknowledges the Queen's commands to dissolve it (p. 198), and a month later Nottingham writes that the King will not call it till "next spring" (p. 234).

The address of the English Parliament on the abuses in Ireland will be found under date March 4th (p. 55), and the Earl of Nottingham directed the Lord Lieutenant to make a full enquiry into the alleged abuses (p. 71). Lord Sydney's reply is dated at Dublin Castle on June the 30th and gives an interesting picture of the state of the country (p. 203). As to the favouring of papists, their promotion in the army and so forth, he gives a very complete denial; indeed, it is apparent throughout the Calendar that the Government in Ireland was far less inclined to favour the Irish Roman Catholics than were the King and his advisers in London. In January the Lord Lieutenant and Council agreed with the report of a Committee specially appointed to consider what should be done with the "regular clergy" in Ireland; the report concluded: "We are of opinion that the great number of the said popish Archbishops, bishops, and regular clergy now in Ireland and exercising foreign jurisdiction tends to the disturbance of the peace, and is against the laws and statutes of this Kingdom"; the Committee therefore advised their expulsion (pp. 9, 10,15). The King himself agreed to the issue of a proclamation directing their withdrawal, and this was to be approved by the Council (p. 51). But no directions reached Ireland, and on May the 17th Lord Sydney reminded Lord Nottingham about it, enclosing a draft proclamation to lay before the Queen (p. 141). Lord Nottingham answered that, on consideration in Council, the King had suspended his previous resolution, and by the Queen's command he (Lord Nottingham), had inguired his further pleasure (p. 162). In reply the King intimated that he did not think it convenient, at that time, to issue the proclamation (p. 179).

So, too, with regard to the interpretation of the Articles of Waterford. Doubt had arisen as to whether the word "property" should apply to both real and personal estates. The King decided that it should, and that his Roman Catholic subjects were to enjoy the full benefit of the said Articles. The Lord Lieutenant protested, pointing out that the. value of estates to be restored would be £1,500 or £2,000 a year (pp. 157-8). Whereupon Lord Nottingham replied that his Majesty "thought it best not to restrain that word [properties] to a narrower construction than the just and legal import of Toae (pe bi. Os).

It was the same in regard to the policy observed towards individuals. Let us take the case of the famous Lady Tyrconnel, On the 12th of July, the Lord Lieutenant was directed to stay proceedings against her (p. 223). The Lords-Justices protested, both to the Earl of Nottingham and the Queen herself. "Lady Tyrconnel," they wrote to the former, "has been so very remarkable here in her acting against their Majesties' and the protestant interest that everyone's eye is watching what is done in her concern" and people would form their conclusions accordingly. Others who might expect no relief will apply and "the popish interest "was not likely to be much "weakened" if so inveterate a woman be permitted to enjoy her estate. To the same effect was their letter to the Queen: "In her activity in the late rebellion she [Lady Tyrconnel] exceeded most others of her sex" and acted towards the Crown not with the duty of a wife to her husband, but with the malice of an open enemy, provoking him on all occasions against the protestants of the kingdom; and when she could do no more mischief here she fled into an enemy's country and continues there to this day.... She has forfeited by her own treason, as well as by that of her husband" (pp. 357-358).

To these letters the reply came on the 17th of October. The Queen, wrote Lord Nottingham, had only ordered in Lady Tyrconnel's case what justice demanded and "her Majesty will not deny justice to any of her subjects" (p. 368).

The proceedings of the army in Ireland formed the subject of a strong letter from Lord Sydney, dated on the 25th of April. There were, he wrote, daily complaints against both officers and soldiers. "I have," he continues, "found out several officers who are guilty, and have suspended them, which they do not consider any great punishment, but, according to my instructions, I can do no more. I will have them tried by a court martial; but that will not signify much, for the whole army is faulty and they will excuse one another, so that I see no remedy for this great grievance, but either to give the Lord Lieutenant power to "break" an officer directly he has offended, or else to send these regiments away, for they have been so used to plunder these four years that it will be almost impossible to bring them into proper order and regularity, and unless some course be taken there will be cruel complaints next sessions of parliament" (p. 109).

In acknowledging this letter, Lord Nottingham wrote that the Queen knew well the mischievous consequences of the licentious proceedings of the Army, and approved of the Lord Lieutenant proceeding to the "utmost extent" of his power in correcting those abuses (p. 124). As Lord Sydney anticipated, the trial by court martial proved a mere farce, and he strongly urged that power to do more than temporarily suspend an offending officer be given to. him (p. 166). He concludes the letter in which he reports the failure of the trial, by mentioning a remarkable case of abduction by a Lieutenant Francis Flood (iid). The Queen was not long in giving her decision: three officers, apparently the "most faulty," were to be cashiered, others were left to be dealt with at the LordLieutenant's discretion, and Lieutenant Flood was to be immediately cashiered (p. 177). Lord Sydney at once acted on these instructions and believed that such prompt administration of punishment would have a very salutary effect (p. 192). In the instructions to the Lords-Justices, who were just then taking the place of the Lord Lieutenant, we find special directions that the army was to be "quartered" with as little burthen and inconvenience as possible" (p. 194). Later on, the Lords-Justices were able to report that the army was in a better state of discipline (p. 277).

The legal papers relating to Ireland are of some interest, and the condition of the judges is vividly brought before us by a letter written at the close of the year by the LordsJustices to the Treasury. They wrote this letter in forwarding a petition of the judges, and they stated that they would not, "under this great want of money," promote it did they not believe that the good administration of justice depended upon its being adopted. The judges' salaries were so small that they did not answer their necessary expenses; much less did they support the dignity of their stations. Worse still, their necessity was an incitement to the reception of bribes, for an Irish judgeship was to a lawyer more a punishment than a preferment ! (p. 416)

There are a few references to the charges brought against Sir Charles Porter, the Irish Lord Chancellor. Sir Charles alleges that his traducrs are disowned by all "sober gentlemen" in Ireland, and that there were not ten "men of quality" in the country who did not "dislike" these procedings (p. 265). He evidently was not averse to meeting his accusers (p. 296), and the Lords-Justices express the opinion that he is "a very able and useful man" (p, 351).

Church matters in Ireland receive no very important illustration. The discussion over the appointment of the Irish Primate revealed a considerable divergency of opinion between the Lords-Justices. As early as May doth, Lord Coningsby had referred to the illness of the Primate and the pretensions of the Bishop of Meath to succeed him—in his opinion "a more improper man" could not be found (p. 122). The Primate's death is mentioned in November. "There were then three candidates for the post, the Archbishop of Tuam, and the Bishops of Kildare and Meath. Sir Cyril Wyche and Mr. Duncombe advocated the claims of the former of the two bishops (p. 400), whilst Lord Capell described his elevation as throwing a firebrand into the Church" (p, 405).

Some light on the feeling with which the Scotch in Ireland were regarded is thrown by the remarks made by the Lord Lieutenant, under date 18 February. A mayor of Londonderry who had "never been at church in his life," had been chosen by the "Scotch faction" whose power was, in the Lord Lieutenant's opinion, already too great "to bear"; he continues: 'the King intends to raise two regiments in Scotland for service in Ireland ... already more than half the army are Scotch ... the Hnglish fear them to such a degree that there will be some difficulty in persuading them to stay in the country if the regiments are raised" (p. 39). A little later he writes that it would be well if these regiments (they had been formed) could serve in England, and two English regiments be sent to Ireland in their stead (p. 1).

There is, perhaps, in the present volume, an unusual amount of topographical material and a good deal of it relates to the metropolis. We have, for instance, a petition from the inhabitants of the hamlet of Wapping to be formed into a distinct parish—a suggestion that was opposed by the rector of Whitechapel (p. 441); and a complaint by tenants of houses in Pall Mall and neighbourhood, who had, in the past, reaped much profit from letting lodgings and selling goods, because of a passage from the Mall into "their Majesties' park," which had been, for long, enjoyed by favour of the Crown; this passage had been stopped up, and with the closing of it came an entire loss of the petitioners livelihoods. 'They therefore prayed that it might be again opened. 'The matter was referred "to consider if a door into this park, as desired, can be opened" (p. 186). Other topographical entries of importance relate to Margate pier, Chatham Dock, the Hampshire Avon, and of the lighthouse on the Spurn.

There is little reference to the Channel Islands, yet their importance as ports of observation must have been considerable, and we find the Governors of Jersey and Guernsey directed to dispatch a yacht "once in five or six weeks, or to Southampton, which should carry any news of importance (pp. 217-218). 'The Isle of Man finds mention in reference to a petition—submitted on the 1st of March, by the Earl of Nottingham to the Treasury, and which the King was disposed to grant—from the Earl of Derby, to be allowed to establish on the island a mint at which he should coin "a base metal" not exceeding the value of £10,000. The Harl designed the setting up of a linen manufactory there (p. 54).

As in the previous volumes of this Calendar, the legal papers are numerous and interesting. In the present case, perhaps the most noteworthy (except those relating to Irish law already mentioned), are the documents in connection with the patronage pertaining to the office of Lord Keeper, and those relating to the Charter of the East Indian Company.

At the end of March—in reference to an intimation that Mr. Ward had been appointed Attorney-General—Sir John Somers wrote to the King apparently protesting against the usurpation of patronage which he considered belonged to his own office. The letter is, unfortunately, so torn in important parts that its exact sense is obscure, but it is clear that the Lord Keeper resented the filling in of high offices through any channel but himself. "The lawyers," he writes, "are spread over every part of the kingdom" and have great influence among the people. 'The method used to unite them in their service to the Crown, had been by obliging them to a dependence on the Great Seal for their promotion, where they merited it, which had always given weight to that office in public affairs; "and," he continues, "if I understand you aright, making the Great Seal thus considerable was one of the effects you expected from placing it in a single hand; but I submit it to you how far it is likely to succeed, or any of your Majesty's ends to be answered, when such eminent offices are disposed of im such a manner at my entrance upon this charge" (p. 84).

With regard to the East Indian Company's new charter, in September Sir John Somers, by the Queen's command, laid the whole story before the King: 'The Company, by neglecting to pay, at the given day, the sum fixed upon it by Act of Parliament, was dissolved, and, in strictness of law, the King was entitled to its estate. He would not, however, take advantage of this, but desired that, as far as possible, the Company should be restored to its former condition. The charter was ready, but the merchants of the City had petitioned against it, alleging that, matters being as they were, the King was engaged to dissolve the Company by reason of a construction which they put upon a royal message to the House of Commons.

"Another thing," wrote Sir John Somers, "which is stood upon is that, except by Act of Parliament, the sole trade of the Indies cannot be granted toa few of your subjects exclusive of all the rest." The chief merchants of the country were united against the charter, alleging (especially those trading with Turkey) their recent losses as a reason against being excluded from the trade "of so great a part of the world." "I had," says the writer, "a private discourse with Lord Chief Justice Holt this evening (he being the only judge in town), and by what I can collect from him, if these points were put to the judges, he thinks they would be of opinion against the Hast Indian Company, especially as to the stopping of ships at this time when there is no charter in being."

All things considered, therefore, the Tord Keeper was of opinion that if the King decided that the charter should pass, and ships, other than those of the Company, be stayed, it must be done "either without asking the judges' opinions or consulting them." If their opinions should be demanded, I have told you what reason I have to apprehend which way they will determine, and I must confess I should be sorry to have such a point determined against the Crown, and should think it much better it should remain a doubt, as it does now. On the other side, as it is a matter of law insisted upon, I am apt to think it will be difficult to prevail with the Lords of the Council to advise her Majesty to pass the charter, or stay the ships without taking the opinion of the judges" (pp. 323-4),

Presumably the King acted on the Lord Keeper's advice, for we find warrants for a new Charter under date September the 29th and November 2nd.

The miserable state of the country's finance finds very frequent illustration, especially in the letters of Lord Godolphin to the King. It is difficult to know in which of these letters the lack of funds is most forcibly brought forward, but the following quotations from his letters of the 9th of June and the 18th August put matters vividly before the reader. At the former date he writes: "I wish your other commands of finding money to carry on the expenses of the navy and army till your return were as possible; but wishing will not make it so." The civil government was nearly at a standstill, "nor," continues the writer, "is there one shilling to be had for any occasion of that kind but what we borrow upon the revenue of excise" (p. 174). And at the latter date: 'We have borrowed money in the City upon credit for the review of the poll, so as to be able, I hope: to carry on the subsistence for some time longer; but this being the last of our funds, when that is once at an end, the revenue being all anticipated, I cannot see any prospect how we shall go on afterwards; no more than that a parliament is likely to sit and give any money or credit timely enough to prevent the service from standing still" (p. 274).

As in former volumes, some of the miscellaneous matters illustrated by the Calendar are worthy of note, but space forbids mention of any save a very few.

A question of the immunity of a consul from arrest for debt is referred to on p. 35. The consul of the States General in Ireland had contracted liabilities to the extent of £650, and the Lord Lieutenant asks if he is to be protected. He is informed (p. 44) that no protection should be granted, as consuls are not entitled to the privilege of public ministers in that particular, "and much less this man in his circumstances,"

Many of the items in the bill of expenses of the King's envoy to the Swiss Cantons from 1690 to 1692 are exceedingly curious and illustrate King William's policy in regard to that part of Europe (pp. 40-43). The accounts of Sir William Dutton Colt's expenses as envoy to various of the allied princes from February to May 1693 are also curious; twenty pounds was allowed him for lodgings at Leipsig during the fair "they being very scarce and dear" (p. 176).

Under date 26 August is a warrant authorizing Thomas Rymer, "histographer (sic) royal," to have access to the public records for the purpose of compiling his well-known Fadera (p. 288).

There is an interesting religious census of the different dioceses in the province of Canterbury on pp. 448 and 449, which is only partly printed in Dalrymple. The total number of "papists fit to bear arms" was 4,239, whilst in the northern province there were but 701. In compiling this return those responsible for it found "these things observable:"

1. That many left the church per the late indulgence, who before did frequent it.

2. Sending for the present enquiries has caused many to frequent the church.

3. That they are Walloons chiefly that make up the number of dissenters in:Canterbury, Sandwich, and Dover.

4. That the presbyterians are divided, some of them come sometimes to church, therefore such are not wholly dissenters, upon the third enquiry.

5. A considerable part of dissenters are not of any sect whatsoever.

6. Of those that come to church very many do not receive the Sacrament.

7. At Ashford and other places, we find a new sort of heretics aiter the name of Muggleton, a London tailor, in number 30.

8. The rest of the dissenters are presbyterians, anabaptists, independents, and quakers, about equal numbers, only two or three called self-willers professedly. The heads and preachers of the several factions are such as had a great share in the late rebellion.

The Queen's charitable anxiety for the health of her subjects is displayed on the occasion of the return of Sir Francis Wheler's expedition from the West Indies. Sickness prevailed on board the ships to an alarming extent, and her Majesty gave special directions that the soldiers on board should not be landed till the ships had come into port. As to those on board one of the vessels separated from the main fleet, and come into the King's Road near Bristol, where they were to be landed, care was to be taken as to washing their clothes and taking any other needful steps to prevent infection (p. 368). A little later the Commissioners for Sick and Wounded were informed that several of the soldiers from the expedition, though not actually ill, were yet not in a condition to be put ashore, and the Commissioners were directed to provide suitable lodgings and nurses for such men, until they were sent into quarters (p. 375).

Considering the impoverished state of the Exchequer and the lack of trade, we naturally look for indications of want amongst the poor during the winter, and we find the King, moved no doubt by his humane consort, directing: the Bishop of London to enjoin a general collection at the Sunday services, and also a house to house collection by the churchwardens and overseers of the London parishes, on behalf of the poor: the money collected was to be paid into the Chamber of London and distributed as the Bishop and Lord Mayor should direct (p. 424).

In the autumn the Turkey Company had been, by the Queen's express commands, directed to enquire what quantity of "fine silk" there was in England to employ the poor in spinning during the winter (p. 298).

In conclusion, may be mentioned the following curious case regarding labour on Sundays and Holy Days: An officious churchwarden of Plymouth had prosecuted, in the spiritual court, the master-shipwright at the Dockyard and several of his workmen, for working on the last "fast day." As a result, the persons prosecuted, and others employed about the Government Works, were so "affrighted" that it became impossible to persuade them to work on Sundays or other Holy Days "though the necessity be never so great.' The Admiralty informed Secretary Trenchard of the fact, that care might be taken to avoid the recurrence of such prosecution (p. 260). By the Queen's direction the Bishop of Exeter was directed to stop the prosecution (p. 260).

W. J. Harpy.

Public Record Office.

December, 1903.